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Using a panel of 54 countries between 1980 and 2013, we find empirical support for the view that 
changes in the fiscal policy stance (year-on-year change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance) have a significant positive correlation with inflation volatility. An increase in the 
volatility of discretionary fiscal policies by one standard deviation raises inflation volatility 
between 5 and 6 percent. Moreover, results using alternatively different inflation volatility 
proxies confirm that an expansionary fiscal stance increases price volatility. Another relevant 
outcome is that in a context of economic expansions (recessions) the harmful impact of fiscal 
activism on price volatility is soften (heightened), while the negative impact of fiscal activism on 
price stability is higher when fiscal policy is expansionary. Finally, fiscal activism fuels inflation 
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Inflation volatility has been an important topic in the literature looking at the relationship 
between inflation and economic growth. On the one hand, several studies have concluded that 
high inflation (and associated high inflation volatility) are generally harmful to growth. On the 
other hand, only few studies have focused on disentangling the individual channels through 
which such effect occurs. High variability of inflation over time makes expectations over the 
future price level more uncertain. In a world with nominal contracts this induces risk premia for 
long-term arrangements, raises costs for hedging against inflation risks and leads to unanticipated 
redistribution of wealth. Thus, inflation volatility can impede growth even if inflation on average 
remains restrained (Friedman, 1977).  
Judson and Orphanides (1999) found evidence that inflation volatility (measured by the 
standard deviation of intra-year inflation rates) has led to lower economic growth in a large panel 
of countries. Also, Froyen and Waud (1987) found that high inflation induces high inflation 
volatility and uncertainty in the USA, Germany, Canada and UK. For the latter two they also 
reported a negative impact of inflation uncertainty on economic growth. Similarly, Al-Marhubi 
(1998) found negative growth effects of conditional and unconditional inflation volatility for a 
panel of 78 countries. Blanchard and Simon (2001) found a strong positive link between inflation 
volatility and output volatility for large advanced countries.  
In this paper, we empirically analyse the impact of the volatility of discretionary fiscal 
policies on the volatility of inflation, while taking other possible explanatory factors into account. 
This approach follows Fatas and Mihov (2003) who reported that discretionary fiscal policies 
have significantly contributed to output volatility in a wide range of countries and Furceri and 
Jalles (2016) who showed that increased fiscal stabilization reduces output fluctuations in a 
country-panel between 1980 and 2013. 
 We use a heterogeneous sample 54 countries covering both advanced and emerging 
economies between 1980 and 2013. By means of panel data techniques, this study finds empirical 
support for the view that changes in the fiscal policy stance (defined as the year-on-year change 
in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, in percent of GDP) show a significant positive 
correlation with inflation volatility. More specifically, heightened fiscal activism adversely 
affects price stability and an increase in the volatility of activist fiscal policies by one standard 




different inflation volatility proxies confirm that an expansionary fiscal stance increases price 
volatility. Another relevant outcome is that in a context of economic expansions (recessions) the 
harmful impact of fiscal activism on price volatility is soften (heightened), while the negative 
impact of fiscal activism on price stability is higher when fiscal policy is expansionary. Finally, 
fiscal activism fuels inflation volatility much more pronouncedly in emerging market economies 
vis-a-vis advanced economies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the related 
literature. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 reports and discusses our 
main results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There are several potential channels through which fiscal policies can affect inflation. The 
first one is the effect of prices’ evolution on aggregate demand. The second, the spillover from 
public wages into private sector as well as taxes affecting marginal costs and private 
consumption. Notably, Afonso and Gomes (2014), looking at an OECD panel, report that the 
growth of public sector wages and of public sector employment positively affects the growth of 
private sector wages. Thirdly, fiscal policy can affect inflation through public expectations 
regarding the ability of future governments to redeem the outstanding public debt. 
On the one hand, the impacts of fiscal policies on inflation have been extensively 
addressed in the literature notably going back to Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic. In that context, although the monetary authority presently keeps inflation 
low, if the fiscal authority sets the budget independently, then the monetary authority will be 
forced to create money and tolerate more inflation in the future. 
On the other hand, a less orthodox view of how fiscal developments might impinge on the 
price level can be traced to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), initially made popular 
by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994, 1995). Leeper-Sims-Woodford argue that it 
will be then up to the government budget constraint to play a key role in the determination of the 
price level. Therefore, in this so-called “strong form” of the FTPL, fiscal policy may have a 
relevant role, at least as important as monetary policy, in determining the price level, affecting it 




In fact, there is also a renewed interest in countercyclical fiscal policy, as a possible 
policy measure to deal with the eventual limitations of monetary policy in a situation of very low 
interest rates and subdued growth. For instance, Tulip (2014) argues that countercyclical fiscal 
policy can help in stabilising the economy, in the absence of targeting higher inflation levels.  
 Regarding empirical studies on the link between budget balances and inflation, for 
instance, Catão and Terrones (2003), using a panel analysis for 107 countries over the period 
1960-2001, report a positive link between budget deficits and inflation only in the case of 
developing countries with high levels of inflation. Fischer et al. (2002), looking at 133 countries 
between 1960 and 1996, also report such a link between fiscal imbalances and inflation for high 
inflation cases. More specifically, on volatility, Rother (2004) reports that for OECD countries 
between 1967 and 2001, fiscal policy volatility has increased inflation volatility, using notably 
GARCH models.  
Bassetto and Butters (2010), for an OECD panel between1970 and2008, do not find 
evidence that budget deficits have preceded higher inflation. In this case, and depending on the 
country, the authors use either data for the general government or for the central government. On 
the other hand, Tiwari et al. (2013) use quarterly data for the period 1990-2013 for several OECD 
countries and report frequency domain causality from inflation to budget deficits and a long-run 
relationship for Belgium, and France. 
In a VAR set up for 5 OECD countries (USA, 1961: Q1-2000:Q4; West Germany, 
1961:Q1-1989:Q4; United Kingdom, 1964:Q1-2001:Q2; Canada, 1962:Q1-2001:Q4; Australia, 
1964:Q1-2000:Q4) Perotti (2002) shows that the effect of government spending on the price level 
is positive, although mostly small and seldom statistically significant. In addition, Afonso and 
Sousa (2012) using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression approach for the US, the UK, 
Germany and Italy, find that government spending shocks do not have an effect on the price 
level. 
Finally, in the context of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model setup, de 
Graeve and von Heideken (2013), for the period 1966:Q1-2011:Q2, conjecture that concerns 
about fiscal inflation increase anticipated long-run inflation, notably as far as future projections 







3. Empirical Methodology and Data Issues 
This paper assesses the empirical link between a measure of inflation volatility and a measure 
of fiscal policy volatility for a panel of 54 advanced and emerging countries between 1980 and 
2013, controlling for a set of possible additional explanatory factors.1 Generally, in regression 
terms, this is equivalent to: 
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t
σ  denote inflation volatility and the volatility of discretionary fiscal policies, 
respectively. tX  is a vector of control variables. 
Several alternative measures for inflation volatility are used. The first measure and our 
baseline measure will consist of an unconditional proxy of inflation volatility based on a 5-year 
rolling standard deviation of the CPI inflation rate. This unconditional inflation volatility measure 
captures the extent of short-term fluctuations in inflation. The idea underlying this approach is 
that changes in discretionary fiscal policies either directly or indirectly induce reactions in 
inflation, making it more volatile in the short run.  
Our second measure relies on setting up an appropriate inflation forecast model to capture the 
impact of discretionary fiscal policies on the uncertainty of expected inflation. The underlying 
assumption is that changes in discretionary fiscal policies make inflation forecasting more 
difficult translating into larger forecast errors. In a panel setting there is a trade-off between 
forecast accuracy and structural homogeneity to countries when generating a proxy for inflation 
expectations. Complex models would be able of produce quite accurate inflation forecasts for 
individual countries; however, these country models would most likely differ across countries, 
making any inference for the panel problematic. As a result, a time series approach is employed 
to generate a proxy for inflation expectations. An AR(1) model with GARCH(1,1) structure for 
residual variances is estimated at annual frequency, with the forecast error variance representing 
conditional inflation uncertainty. The conditional variances are corrected for a potentially 
distorting effect. Assuming that the level of the fiscal stance should have a systematic impact on 
                                                 
1 The list of countries is presented in the Appendix. The set of 54 countries is dictated by data availability, namely by 
the variable cyclically adjusted balance balanced provided by the IMF WEO database and used in this paper as the 




the level of inflation, the unconditional variances of the two variables would be positively related. 
Consequently, results from a regression involving the variances could suggest a strong 
relationship, reflecting the interaction of the levels. Our conditional inflation variances account 
for this possible interaction through the inclusion of the level of the fiscal stance in the level 
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where tπ  is the year-on-year inflation rate and tF  is the fiscal stance. The conditional inflation 
volatility is given by the one-step-ahead standard deviation tσ  for each forecast of the inflation 
rate.  
 The remainder of our measures of inflation volatility are based on inflation forecasts 
produced by Consensus Economics. In the past decade there has been a huge growth in published 
economic analysis emanating from banks, corporations and independent consultants around the 
world, and a parallel growth in "consensus forecasting" services which gather together 
information from these disparate private sources. Each month since 1989, the Consensus 
Economics service has published forecasts for major economic variables prepared by panels of 
10-30 private sector forecasters and now covers 70 countries. Below the individual forecasts for 
each variable, the service publishes their arithmetic average, the "consensus forecast" for that 
variable.  Consensus forecasts are known to be hard to beat.2 This means that, in practice, the 
most promising alternative to official forecasts for most users of economic forecasts is not some 
naive model, but a consensus of private sector forecasts.3 We use the mean4 of the private 
analysts' monthly consensus forecasts of the inflation rate for the current and next year for the 
period from September 1989 to December 2012. Every month (or every other month in the case 
of some emerging market economies) a new forecast is made of the inflation rate. For each year, 
                                                 
2 While individual private sector forecasts may be subject to various behavioral biases (Batchelor and Dua, 1992), 
many of these are likely to be eliminated by pooling forecasts from several forecasters. 
3 This is recognized by Artis (1996), who makes a visual comparison of IMF and Consensus Economics forecasts for 
real GDP and CPI inflation, and concludes that there is "little difference between WEO and Consensus errors". In a 
similar vein, Loungani (2001) plots real IMF and Consensus Economics GDP forecasts for over 60 developed and 
developing countries in the 1990s, and notes that "the evidence points to near-perfect collinearity between private 
and official (multilateral) forecasts …" 
4 The number of forecasters is greater than 10 for most countries and for the major industrialized countries the 




the sequence of forecasts is the 24 forecasts made between January of the previous year and 
December of the year in question.5 
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth proxies of inflation volatility correspond to the 12-month  
averages and standard deviations for current year and year ahead forecasts. It is important to use 
higher frequency data to better capture the interactions between fiscal policies (that are usually 
only decided and implemented at the annual frequency) and monetary policies (see Melitz, 1997; 
von Hagen et al. 2001; van Aarle et al, 2003; and Muscatelli et al, 2002). The seventh and eighth 
measures are based on forecast revisions, which if forecasts were to be rational and efficient 
would be zero (by fully incorporating the information content available to forecasters at each 
point in time). We define the initial revision of the forecast of inflation rate as the change in the 
forecast between October and April of the previous year and the final revision as the change 
between October of the current year and April of the current year.  
The correlations between our eight measures of inflation volatility are presented in Table 
A1 in the Appendix A. All our measures are positively correlated at the 1 percent statistical 
significance level. 
To measure the volatility of discretionary fiscal policies, our analysis is based on changes 
in the fiscal policy stance. The fiscal policy stance is defined as the year-on-year change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) (in percent of GDP).6 Removing from the overall 
budget balance the effects of changes in interest payments and in the business cycle, reflects the 
net budgetary impact of activist fiscal policy measures. Our first measure of fiscal stance is 
captured by the absolute change in the CAPB between two consecutive years. Our second 
measure, similarly to inflation, is based on a 5-year rolling standard deviation of the CAPB. 
Finally, our set of controls includes, most notably, the following variables. First, we 
control for the level of inflation (given by the CPI percentage change) since it has been observed 
empirically that inflation volatility is highly correlated with its level. Second, we include output 
gap (computed using the HP filter), reflecting the impact of aggregate demand. Third, we add 
                                                 
5 For countries for which only bi-monthly forecasts are available, we use the preceding month forecast as values for 
the months for which forecast data is missing. A similar approach is taken in Loungani et al. (2013) and Jalles et al. 
(2015). 
6 Using the CAPB in percent of potential GDP does not qualitatively change our main results. We decided to use the 
CAPB measure over actual nominal GDP in order to avoid introducing additional (potential) measurement errors 




total government expenditures (in percent of GDP), since large governments tend to reduce the 
volatility of output and inflation in response to demand shocks through the operation of automatic 
fiscal stabilizers (Martinez-Mongay, 2001; Furceri and Jalles, 2016).  Fourth, given that the effect 
of monetary policies offsetting inflationary fiscal policies will induce itself price volatility, we 
control for the 5-year rolling standard deviation of broad money (M2) expressed in percent of 
GDP. Fifth, we add the nominal effective exchange rate since, in an open economy, the CPI 
inflation rate will in part be determined by price movements of foreign goods due to the direct 
inclusion of such goods in the consumption basket or through their use as intermediate inputs. On 
the one hand, inflation volatility is expected to increase with the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate, foreign price volatility and the openness of the economy. On the other, with sticky 
domestic wages and prices, adjustments to shocks to the economy will occur to some extent 
through the exchange rate. In this situation, movements in the nominal exchange rate would 
substitute for changes in prices, implying a negative relationship between variations in the two 
variables. Thus, the overall effect is a priori not obvious. Finally, to account for the spillover 
from foreign prices into domestic prices the share of imports in GDP is also included. 
The following, more detailed, regression equation is estimated: 
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where  ,i tλ δ  are country and time effects respectively, it
πσ is a measure of inflation volatility, itπ
is the CPI inflation rate, F
it
σ is a measure of the fiscal stance, itgap is the output gap, itG is the 
government expenditure (percent of GDP), M
it
σ is the money volatility, ER
it
σ  is the nominal 
exchange rate volatility, itM  is the share of imports in GDP.
7 Finally, itε  stands for an iid error 
term satisfying the usual assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. Equation (3) will be 




                                                 




4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Stylized Facts 
Figure 1 presents a scatterplot of the two key variables in this study, using annual data. 
Inflation volatility, measured by the (log of the) 5-year rolling standard deviation of inflation 
rates, is presented along the x-axis, while fiscal policy volatility, measured by the (log of) 
absolute changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, is presented along the y-axis. Even 
though the scatter does not show a strong relationship, there appears to be some positive link 
between these two variables when other explanatory factors are not accounted for. 
 
Figure 1: Fiscal policy volatility versus inflation volatility (all countries, years) 
 
Note: authors’ calculations. 
 
4.2 Baseline Regression 
We now move on into estimating Equation (3). Table 1 shows the results for three variants 
of the baseline specification where i) one lag of the dependent variable is included in the set of 
regressors, ii) one lag of the dependent variable and one lag of inflation rate are included in the 
set of regressors; iii) two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of inflation rate are included 
in the set of regressors. Moreover, we present OLS results without time or country fixed effects, 
with country fixed effects and with both country and time effects. Looking at the estimated 
coefficients, all of them have the expected signs when significant. More specifically, an increase 
in the level of inflation, a widening of the output gap (overheating), a higher share of imports in 




































GDP bringing in the influence of external prices and higher nominal exchange rate volatility, all 
raise price volatility. Larger governments do seem to moderate fluctuations in prices but 
corresponding estimates are not statistically different from zero in this table. Also, volatility 
monetary policy, while yielding positive coefficient estimates is not statistically significant at 
usual levels. More importantly, our measure of fiscal stance (which in this case takes the form of 
the absolute value of annual changes in the CAPB) comes out with positive and statistically 
significant coefficients, meaning that heightened fiscal activism adversely affects price stability.  
[Table 1] 
 
The size of the impact of the volatility of activist fiscal policies on inflation variability can 
be important. Focusing on the last 3 columns of Table 1, the estimated coefficient for fiscal 
stance is between 0.025 and 0.033. With a cross-country average of standard deviations of 
discretionary fiscal policies of 1.94 percentage points of GDP, this suggests that an increase in 
the volatility of activist fiscal policies by one standard deviation raises inflation volatility 
between 5 and 6 percent. To this direct impact, the indirect impact of the volatility of 
discretionary fiscal policies through their impact on output gap variability needs to be added. 
Based on a comprehensive survey of the literature, Hemming et al. (2002) report a likely size of 
the short-run fiscal multiplier between one half and one. Combining the average of these values 
(3/4) with the coefficient on output gap variability yields a potential additional impact between 
1.5 and 3.5 percent, resulting in a total impact between 6.5 and 9.5 percent for the average across 
the sample. Feedback effects through the interaction of fiscal discretion with the other 
explanatory variables would increase the impact further.  
 In Table 2 we replace our measure of fiscal stance by the 5-year rolling standard deviation 
of the CAPB. Results are generally in line with those reported in Table 1. Now government size 
(proxied by public expenditures) yields a negative and statistically significant coefficient, 
confirming the theoretical role of automatic stabilizers in attenuating general fluctuations. For the 
remainder of the analysis we will use the absolute value of annual changes in the CAPB as our 








4.3 Robustness to alternative estimators and sensitivity to outliers 
It is important to subject our Equation (3) to alternative estimators that help correcting and 
overcoming some of the traditionally encountered econometric pitfalls. First, a positive 
correlation between inflation volatility and fiscal stance can also be the result of reverse causality, 
i.e., higher inflation volatility causing more activist fiscal policies. In addition, the results can be 
driven by a third, omitted variable that affects inflation volatility and the volatility of 
discretionary fiscal policies simultaneously. If we correctly specify the form of the variance (that 
is, if we account for serial correlation and possible cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and then use 
estimated cross-section residual variances as weights), then there exists a more efficient estimator 
(Feasible Generalized Least Squares, FGLS) than OLS. 
Endogeneity between right and left hand side variables can be an additional concern. In an 
attempt to overcome this issue we resort to Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator 
(DIF-GMM). 8 However, as there are a number of limitations of DIF-GMM estimation9, under the 
assumptions set in Arellano and Bover (1995), the system-GMM estimator (SYS-GMM) can be 
used to alleviate the weak instruments problem. The SYS-GMM jointly estimates the equations 
in first differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the dependent and independent 
variables, and in levels, using as instruments the first differences of the regressors.10 Intuitively, 
the system-GMM estimator does not rely exclusively on the first-differenced equations, but 
exploits also information contained in the original equations in levels. 
We also employ the panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimator by Beck and Katz 
(1995). Finally, we run of main regression equation with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard 
errors. This non-parametric technique assumes the error structure to be heteroskedastic, 
autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated between the groups. 
                                                 
8 The GMM approach estimates parameters directly from moment conditions imposed by the model. To enable 
identification the number of moment conditions should be at least as large as the number of unknown parameters. 
Moreover, the mechanics of the GMM approach relates to a standard instrumental variable estimator and also to 
issues such as instrumental validity and informativeness. 
9 For instance, the lagged levels of the series may be weak instruments for first differences, especially when they are 
highly persistent, or the variance of the individual effects is high relative to the variance of the transient shocks 
10 As far as information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) used as instruments in the differences (levels) 
equation, as work by Bowsher (2002) and, more recently Roddman (2009) has indicated, when it comes to moment 
conditions (as thus to instruments) more is not always better. The GMM estimators are likely to suffer from 
“overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or exceeds) the number of groups/countries (as a 
simple rule of thumb). In the present case, the choice of lags was directed by checking the validity of different sets of 




Table 3 shows the results. We observe consistent results across the different estimators, from 
column (1) to (5). Specifically, higher inflation or nominal exchange rate fluctuations enhances 
price volatility. The same is true if fiscal policy becomes more active (in discretionary terms). 
The positive impact of the output gap is only statistically significant in the FGLS regression. 
[Table 3] 
 
Another important aspect to take into consideration is how much outliers drive our results, 
particularly when the sample is heterogeneous and includes emerging market economies that are 
usually characterized by spells of hyper-inflations every now and then. We use several alternative 
methods to exclude potentially adverse outliers form our estimations. First, we employ the Least 
Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimation method which is a robust method in the presence of 
outliers and asymmetric error terms (Bassett and Koenker, 1978). Second, we use the M 
estimation which was introduced by Huber (1973). Third, the S estimation that is a high 
breakdown value method introduced by Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984). Finally, the MM 
estimation, introduced by Yohai (1987), combines high breakdown value estimation and M 
estimation. It has both the high breakdown property and a higher statistical efficiency than S 
estimation. 
Looking at Table 4, with the exception of the S estimator, the remaining show a positive 
and significant impact of fiscal activism on inflation volatility. The other regressors keep the 
previous signs and similar magnitudes. 
[Table 4] 
 
4.4 Using alternative proxies of inflation volatility 
In this sub-section we allow for alternative measures of inflation volatility to play a role 
as the dependent variable. We consider the set of proxies discussed in Section 3, namely the 
GARCH (1,1) implied volatility, the average and standard deviation of 12 months (over the 
current year and year-ahead) forecast errors using Consensus Economics forecasts of inflation 
and, finally, final and initial forecast revisions of inflation using the same source. 
Table 5 includes the baseline for comparison purposes and shows that changes in the 
fiscal stance robustly increase price volatility. This means that fluctuations in both actual 
inflation data and also in inflation expectations, reflecting different horizons of uncertainty, are 






 In Table 6 we repeat the same set of estimations as in Table 5 but we split our sample by 
income group into advanced and emerging countries. In general, fiscal activism in emerging 
market economies fuels inflation volatility much more pronouncedly compared to advanced 
countries. High inflation by itself has also a more damaging effect in price fluctuations in 
emerging markets than in advanced countries.  
[Table 6] 
 
4.5 Fiscal activism, good and bad times and financial crises 
 We go in exploring whether fiscal activism is different during good and bad times of the 
economic business cycle. To this end, we interact our measure of fiscal volatility with positive 
and negative output gap. We observe in Table 7 that during economic expansions (recessions) the 
detrimental effect of fiscal activism on price volatility is soften (heightened). Going one step 
further, and focusing on bad times or recessionary periods, we interact our fiscal stance measure 
with dummy variables for financial crises, banking crises and currency crises (retrieved from 
Leaven and Valencia, 2008, 2010). Particularly during currency crises, which themselves 
increase inflation volatility, discretionary fiscal policy actions tend to exacerbate the price 
volatility impact. 
 [Table 7] 
 
4.6 Fiscal activism and asymmetric effects 
 Finally, does our measure of fiscal stance defined as the absolute value of annual changes 
in the CAPB have differentiated effects is those changes mean an improvement or a deterioration 
of the fiscal stance? We explore this by splitting our proxy for fiscal volatility into the absolute 
value of positive changes and the absolute value of negative changes. Table 8 shows that the 
negative impact of increased fiscal activism in price stability is particularly high during times of 
budgetary expansion. When the budgetary position is improving, that is, the CAPB improves 
between two years, by means of fiscal consolidation, the effect of discretionary fiscal actions on 






5.  Conclusion 
The links between fiscal policy and inflation are important in terms of inflationary 
pressures from fiscal expansions and also regarding the potential instability effects of government 
activities on price volatility. 
In his paper, we have used a panel sample of 54 countries covering both advanced and 
emerging economies between 1980 and 2013, and we found empirical support for the view that 
changes in the fiscal policy stance show a significant positive correlation with inflation volatility. 
In addition, after accounting for possible endogeneity between right and left hand side variables, 
using the difference GMM estimator, we still found similar results. Therefore, more active fiscal 
policy increases price volatility.  
Moreover, we have also resorted to alternative measures of inflation volatility: GARCH 
(1,1) implied volatility; the average and standard deviation of 12 months forecast errors using 
Consensus Economics forecasts; final and initial forecast revisions of inflation using the same 
source. Our results using different inflation volatility proxies confirm that expansionary fiscal 
stance augments price volatility. 
Taking into account the two sub-samples of advanced and emerging economies, fiscal 
activism fuels inflation volatility much more pronouncedly in the case of emerging market 
economies vis-a-vis advanced economies. 
Another relevant result relates to the fact that in a context of economic expansions 
(recessions) the harmful impact of fiscal activism on price volatility is soften (heightened). In the 
same vein, the negative impact of fiscal activism on price stability is higher when fiscal policy is 
expansionary. This has a useful policy implication since hints at the idea that discretionary fiscal 
policy can produce less price volatility in boom times. On the other hand, in the context of a 
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Table 1: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion (measured as the absolute value of fiscal 
stance) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Effects  No  Country Time+country No  Country Time+country No  Country Time+country 
Regressors           
          
dep.var. (-1) 0.528*** 0.425*** 0.429*** 0.687*** 0.588*** 0.613*** 0.797*** 0.686*** 0.700*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) 
dep.var. (-2)       -0.135*** -0.133*** -0.117*** 
       (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
inflation 0.055*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.146*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.150*** 0.135*** 0.129*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
inflation (-1)    -0.129*** -0.100*** -0.114*** -0.121*** -0.093*** -0.108*** 
    (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
fiscal stance 0.016 0.031** 0.027** 0.027** 0.035*** 0.032** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
output gap 0.029* 0.031** 0.025 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
gov.expenditures -0.005** -0.009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.012* -0.018** -0.004** -0.009 -0.015** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
sd.money 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
imports_gdp (-1) 0.004*** 0.000 -0.003 0.002** -0.006 -0.004 0.002* -0.007* -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
          
Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723 723 723 723 
R-squared 0.782 0.835 0.848 0.833 0.857 0.872 0.841 0.864 0.877 
Note: OLS regression with different sets of time and country effects as identified in the second row. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Constant term was estimated by omitted for reasons of parsimony. 
 
 
Table 2: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion (measured as 5-year rolling standard 
deviation of fiscal stance) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Regressors           
          
dep.var. (-1) 0.535*** 0.448*** 0.460*** 0.701*** 0.638*** 0.656*** 0.749*** 0.691*** 0.711*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
dep.var. (-2)       -0.060*** -0.076*** -0.079*** 
       (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
inflation 0.071*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.150*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.153*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
inflation (-1)    -0.146*** -0.135*** -0.143*** -0.141*** -0.129*** -0.137*** 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
fiscal stance 0.137*** 0.190*** 0.172*** 0.089*** 0.116*** 0.103*** 0.085*** 0.109*** 0.099*** 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) 
output gap 0.022 0.022 0.030 0.053*** 0.044*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.059*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
gov.expenditures -0.011*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.008*** -0.018* -0.019** -0.009*** -0.016* -0.017* 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) 
sd.money -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
imports_gdp (-1) 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.010** -0.004 -0.001 -0.011*** -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
          
Observations 806 806 806 805 805 805 805 805 805 
R-squared 0.816 0.842 0.853 0.869 0.880 0.890 0.871 0.883 0.892 
Note: OLS regression with different sets of time and country effects as identified in the second row. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 




Table 3: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion (measured as the absolute value of fiscal 
stance), alternative estimators 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Standard Errors  
Difference GMM System GMM 
Regressors       
dep.var. (-1) 0.749*** 0.705*** 0.615*** 0.611*** 0.535*** 
 (0.031) (0.099) (0.049) (0.238) (0.158) 
dep.var. (-2) -0.155*** -0.134** -0.092*** -0.512*** -0.114* 
 (0.026) (0.050) (0.027) (0.157) (0.069) 
inflation 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 
 (0.007) (0.026) (0.015) (0.023) (0.035) 
inflation (-1) -0.076*** -0.090*** -0.079*** 0.029 -0.056 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.015) (0.054) (0.038) 
fiscal stance 0.017*** 0.033*** 0.029* 0.135*** 0.038** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.050) (0.018) 
output gap 0.016*** 0.023 0.020 0.037 0.028 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.013) (0.029) (0.020) 
gov.expenditures -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 0.022 -0.019 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.027) (0.014) 
sd.money 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.028 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.048) (0.013) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.007** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.036* 0.034*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.020) (0.009) 
imports_gdp (-1) 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) 
Observations 848 848 848 794 848 
AR(1))    0.020 0.002 
AR(2)    0.146 0.747 
Hansen (p-value)    0.863 0.751 
Note: Estimation using alternative estimators as identified in the second row. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
AR(1) and AR(2) denote the p-values for the first and second order serial correlation in the residuals. The Hansen p-
value tests the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions, that is validity of 
the instruments. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Constant 
term was estimated by omitted for reasons of parsimony. 
 
Table 4: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion (measured as the absolute value of fiscal 
stance), outlier robust 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator LAD M S MM 
Regressors     
dep.var. (-1) 0.495*** 0.761*** 0.947*** 0.883*** 
 (0.018) (0.036) (0.024) (0.025) 
inflation 0.052*** 0.030*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
fiscal stance 0.017* 0.015** 0.002 0.014** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
output gap 0.021** 0.035*** 0.010* 0.020*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
gov.expenditures -0.002 -0.002 -0.001* -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.021*** 0.009*** -0.004** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
imports_gdp (-1) 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.000 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 839 848 848 848 
R-squared 0.764    
Note: Estimation using alternative estimators as identified in the second row. The LAD denotes the least-adbsolute 
deviation; the M denotes the Huber (1973) estimator; the S denotes the high breakdown value method introduced by 
Rousseew and Yohai (1984); the MM denotes the method of moments estimator due to Yohai (1987)—see main text 
for details. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 




Table 5: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion (measured as the absolute value of fiscal 
stance), alternative dependent variables 

























of monthly inflation 
forecast errors 
(current year) 
Regressors          
dep.var. (-1) 0.705*** 0.730*** 0.101** 0.114** -0.054* 0.190*** 0.100*** 0.042*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.044) (0.047) (0.031) (0.021) (0.039) (0.012) 
inflation 0.121*** -0.022*** 8.149*** 13.087*** 32.471*** 16.208*** 5.302 9.829*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (1.155) (1.550) (1.856) (1.269) (3.293) (0.695) 
fiscal stance 0.033*** 0.012*** 0.051*** 0.036 0.124*** 0.041** 0.079* 0.039*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.022) (0.037) (0.019) (0.044) (0.010) 
output gap 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.029 0.084*** 0.221*** 0.131*** 0.151** 0.077*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.021) (0.028) (0.047) (0.028) (0.062) (0.015) 
gov.expenditures -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.012 0.014 0.011 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.027) (0.006) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.019*** -0.000 -0.011*** -0.006** 0.038*** 0.020*** 0.077*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
imports_gdp (-1) -0.001 0.002 -0.014*** -0.018** -0.011 -0.018*** -0.001 -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.004) 
         
Observations 848 912 548 525 617 616 617 616 
R-squared 0.848 0.755 0.414 0.477 0.542 0.690 0.534 0.673 
Note: OLS regression with different proxies for the dependent variable as identified in the second row. Time and 
country effects included but omitted. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 






Table 6: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion (measured as the absolute value of fiscal stance), alternative dependent 
variables, by income group 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dependent 
variable 




Final forecast revision Average of monthly 
inflation Forecast 
Errors (current year) 
Standard deviation of 
monthly inflation 
forecast errors (current 
year) 
Average of monthly 
inflation Forecast 
Errors (year ahead) 
Standard deviation of 
monthly inflation 
forecast errors (year 
ahead) 
Income group  AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM 
Regressors                  
dep.var. (-1) 0.926*** 0.486*** 0.647*** 0.702*** 0.052 0.138 -0.012 0.158 0.056 -0.040 0.094** 0.189*** 0.106** 0.101 0.036 0.031 
 (0.036) (0.067) (0.043) (0.044) (0.051) (0.094) (0.050) (0.099) (0.048) (0.054) (0.045) (0.039) (0.053) (0.080) (0.044) (0.022) 
inflation 0.100*** 0.132*** 0.001 -0.019*** -1.354 10.152*** 3.788* 17.317*** 0.598 37.187*** 1.599** 22.338*** 9.064*** 7.461 1.455*** 13.813*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.001) (0.006) (1.559) (2.442) (1.948) (3.615) (0.999) (3.520) (0.715) (2.670) (2.774) (7.877) (0.525) (1.436) 
fiscal stance 0.010 0.067** 0.001** 0.038*** -0.003 0.172*** -0.017 0.164** -0.006 0.262** 0.000 -0.000 0.032 0.044 -0.001 0.045 
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.001) (0.013) (0.009) (0.053) (0.013) (0.079) (0.010) (0.109) (0.006) (0.053) (0.024) (0.124) (0.005) (0.027) 
output gap 0.029*** 0.040** 0.000 0.009 0.027* 0.059 0.034* 0.169** -0.007 0.390*** -0.012 0.235*** 0.032 0.252* 0.020*** 0.139*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.001) (0.009) (0.015) (0.054) (0.019) (0.075) (0.014) (0.113) (0.010) (0.061) (0.040) (0.140) (0.008) (0.031) 
gov.expenditures -0.000 -0.047* -0.001*** -0.014 0.005 -0.009 0.002 -0.034 0.004 0.048 -0.000 -0.113** 0.015 -0.012 -0.001 -0.067** 
 (0.001) (0.027) (0.000) (0.011) (0.005) (0.057) (0.007) (0.088) (0.005) (0.089) (0.003) (0.051) (0.013) (0.122) (0.002) (0.026) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.004* 0.040*** 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.009* -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.034*** 0.000 0.019*** -0.022 0.075*** -0.000 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) 
imports_gdp (-1) 0.001*** -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.007** -0.018 0.010*** 0.029 0.005* 0.020 0.005*** 0.075*** 0.009 0.027 0.003* 0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.019) (0.004) (0.033) (0.003) (0.034) (0.002) (0.021) (0.008) (0.051) (0.001) (0.011) 
                 
Observations 609 239 625 287 397 151 386 139 422 195 422 194 422 195 422 194 
R-squared 0.814 0.850 0.752 0.796 0.352 0.484 0.354 0.497 0.194 0.602 0.461 0.780 0.434 0.589 0.468 0.767 
Note: OLS regression with different proxies for the dependent variable as identified in the second row. Time and country effects included but omitted. Sub-
sampling analysis as identified in the third row: AE - advanced economies; EM - emerging countries. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 




Table 7: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion (measured as the absolute value of fiscal stance), recessions and financial crises 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regressors     
dep.var. (-1) 0.538*** 0.394*** 0.532*** 0.526*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.020) (0.020) 
inflation 0.052*** 0.089*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) 
fiscal stance 0.023** 0.039 0.022** 0.021* 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) 
output gap 0.023** 0.028* 0.028*** 0.021** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) 
gov.expenditures -0.003 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
imports_gdp (-1) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Recession* fiscal stance 0.100***    
 (0.032)    
Expansion* fiscal stance -0.083**    
 (0.040)    
FC  0.004   
  (0.003)   
FC* fiscal stance  0.181   
  (0.173)   
banking   0.002  
   (0.001)  
Banking* fiscal stance   0.158*  
   (0.082)  
currency    0.006** 
    (0.003) 
Currency* fiscal stance    0.196* 
    (0.102) 
Observations 848 282 848 848 
R-squared 0.775 0.747 0.775 0.775 
Note: OLS regression. Time and country effects included but omitted. “FC” denotes overall financial crises. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** 




Table 8: Price Volatility and Fiscal Discretion, asymmetric effects to fiscal expansions and 
consolidations 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Changes in fiscal 
stance 
negative positive negative positive negative positive 
Regressors        
       
dep.var. (-1) 0.314*** 0.664*** 0.606*** 0.775*** 0.639*** 0.966*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.045) 
dep.var. (-2)     -0.042 -0.262*** 
     (0.026) (0.039) 
inflation 0.109*** 0.033*** 0.217*** 0.065*** 0.219*** 0.083*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) 





   (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
fiscal stance 0.041** 0.016 0.053** 0.013 0.059*** 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) 
output gap 0.030* 0.034*** 0.030* 0.043*** 0.033* 0.046*** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) 
gov.expenditures -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
sd NEER (-1) 0.042*** 0.016*** 0.026*** 0.007* 0.026*** 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
imports_gdp (-1) -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
       
Observations 415 432 415 432 415 432 
R-squared 0.829 0.854 0.896 0.884 0.897 0.897 
Note: OLS regression. Time and country effects included but omitted. Positive/negative changes in the fiscal stance 
identified in the second row. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 







List of countries 
United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, ,Israel ,Jordan , Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Morocco, Bulgaria, Russia, China, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland, Romania. 
Table A1: Correlation between measures of inflation volatility 
Correlation coefficients 5-year rolling standard 
deviation of inflation 
GARCH(1,1) implied volatility  0.0906*** 
12 average of inflation forecast errors (current year) 0.1633*** 
12 standard deviation of inflation forecast errors (current year) 0.582*** 
12 average of inflation forecast errors (year ahead) 0.3146*** 
12 standard deviation of inflation forecast errors (year ahead) 0.5206*** 
Final forecast revision 0.2812*** 
Initial forecast revision 0.2352*** 
Note: *** denote statistical significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
inflation volatility 1,019 0.016658 0.01706 0.001392 0.205277 
inflation  1,108 0.044474 0.0468 -0.03815 0.619187 
Fiscal stance (absolute value of annual 
changes in CAPB) 1,073 1.310908 1.435464 0 20.5957 
Fiscal stance (5-year rolling standard 
deviation of CAPB) 902 1.543344 1.119784 2.56E-10 9.860977 
Output gap 1,127 0.021269 1.824712 -10.2761 11.16313 
Government expenditures (percent of 
GDP) 1,050 0.389251 0.119925 0.107028 0.709883 
5-year rolling standard deviation of broad 
money 811 5.296203 4.8729 0.149778 28.29758 
5-year rolling standard deviation of 
nominal effective exchange rate 1,019 6.661725 12.99533 0.478694 158.9453 
Imports (percent of GDP) 1,127 41.63763 30.93237 6.866724 228.9812 
GARCH(1,1) implied volatility  1,127 0.00103 0.004479 9.07E-05 0.096468 
12 average of inflation forecast errors 
(current year) 685 -0.03016 2.164524 -38.6369 24.99033 
12 standard deviation of inflation forecast 
errors (current year) 684 0.556557 2.003816 0.031151 42.79421 
12 average of inflation forecast errors 
(year ahead) 685 0.067508 3.40752 -18.3471 53.30989 
12 standard deviation of inflation forecast 
errors (year ahead) 684 0.425946 1.849656 0.029315 45.93566 
Final forecast revision 598 0.051123 1.170511 -13.9086 7.74174 
Initial forecast revision 587 0.194499 3.403151 -18.3861 62.80327 
 
